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My opening lecture on the Role of Frontline 
States in the Liberation of Southern Africa 
represented the first chapter in modern 
Africa’s quest for self-governance. This 
second lecture in the series on 
Democratization in Africa represents the 
second chapter. This second chapter is a 
 2 
story that is every bit as dramatic and 
compelling as the first. 
 
The first chapter was a story of how the 
indigenous people of the continent sacrificed 
and struggled to regain control of their 
countries. This second chapter is about how 
we make our countries work. By that I 
mean, the challenge in the present is how do 
the leaders and people of the continent 
develop systems of governance that enable 
the people to be fully enfranchised and have 
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the range of opportunities that enable them 
to fulfill their God-given potential. 
 
In July of last year, African leaders gathered 
in Durban, South Africa to institutionalize 
their vision of how they saw the people of 
the continent being enfranchised. In 
summary, with the inauguration of the 
African Union, the leaders of Africa 
declared that accelerating the pace of 
democratization and development of the 
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economic infrastructure on the continent 
could best fulfill Africa’s potential. 
 
I was fortunate enough to have been there. It 
was indeed a moving experience. As one of 
the founders of the Organization of African 
Unity, it was great to see the new generation 
of African leaders take this bold step to 
secure Africa’s future. While the formation 
of the African Union is a seminal step in 
Africa’s move toward democratization it 
was not the first step. The winds of 
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democratization have been blowing across 
the continent for some time. This metaphor 
of the “winds of democratization” is so 
appropriate because just as the winds ebb 
and flow so has Africa’s move toward 
democratic governance. But having said 
that, there are a number of countries that 
have several cycles of democratic elections. 
Countries like Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, 
and my own country of Zambia. There are 
others that seem to be securely moving 
 6 
through their first cycle of viable democratic 
elections like Benin, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, 
and Senegal. And, with President Chissano’s 
announcement that he will be stepping down 
at the end of his current term and the recent 
election in Kenya (which I observed) the 
trend is certain to continue. 
 
A moment ago I said that the inauguration of 
the AU was a watershed in Africa’s move 
toward democratization, to understand why 
it took until 2002 to institutionalize this step 
 7 
toward democratization in Africa, it is first 
important to understand the obstacles. While 
some of Africa’s most harsh and unfair 
critics would suggest that Africa’s move to 
democratization reflects the lack of a 
democratic culture and the intractable 
conflicts rooted in tribalism; I beg to differ. 
To be sure, the lack of a modern history of 
democratic governance is a factor affecting 
democracy’s development, as are the tribal 
conflicts that have been exacerbated by the 
artificial country boundaries drawn by 
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colonial powers. But, Africa’s move toward 
democratization has been slowed by factors 
a lot less nebulous, and a lot more 
manageable. 
 
The obstacles to Africa’s move toward 
democratization have principally been 
political and economic. The political 
problems are the most obvious and 
commonly documented. Number one on the 
list of obstacles to democratization on the 
continent was the Cold War. As the United 
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States and the former Soviet Union used 
Africa as a battleground to fight ideological, 
and in some cases, real proxy wars the affect 
was the destabilization of governments 
across the continent. A classic case in point 
is Western support, led by Belgium, for the 
Mobutu government in Zaire. The disastrous 
effects of that are still being felt. (While I’m 
on this point, it should be noted for the 
record that t one point, U.S. aid to prop up 
Mobutu in Zaire was more than the aid to all 
of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.)  Now, to 
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go back to my point about western control 
by proxy, let me add that one of the things 
that has African leadership nervous about 
this notion of “regime change” being touted 
during this present crisis around Iraq are the 
past implications it has had for places like 
Africa. Western “successful” regime change 
has resulted in the assassination of leaders 
like Lumumba and the imposition of 
kleptocrats like Mobutu.  
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Beyond Zaire, there are other examples, like 
Angola, of the destabilizing affects of the 
Cold War. Let me add, the effects of the 
Cold War agenda continued to haunt Africa 
like a ghost up until the recent capture and 
death on Jonas Savimbi in Angola. 
 
Second on the list of political obstacles is 
something I referred to in my lecture 
yesterday, and that was the attacks on 
independent African nation states by 
oppressive forces in other African states that 
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were committed to maintaining power. Here, 
Zambia is exhibit number one. Because of 
our support for the liberation struggles of the 
people of Angola, South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, and Mozambique; at various 
times my country and my government was 
under siege from the Boers of South Africa 
and Namibia, the Rhodesians, and the 
Portuguese. The liberation of the continent 
was directly related to the direction of 
governance on the continent. Not many 
people outside of Zambia know this, but in 
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my case the freedom of Nelson Mandela 
also allowed us in Zambia a freedom to get 
on with our lives. I can remember the day 
that Mandela was released from prison as if 
were yesterday,. That day my eyes welled 
up with tears and I dropped to my knees and 
I offered prayers of thanksgiving to God that 
that day had finally come. After my prayers, 
I arose from my knees, wiped my eyes, and 
called my most trusted advisors together to 
put in place the machinery to move Zambia 
toward multiparty elections. With freedom 
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secured on the continent, other made the 
same decision that I did, that being that the 
time was upon us to move to next level of 
governance. I’d like to think that what we 
did, what I did, reflected what Americans 
did in electing President Franklin Roosevelt 
to four terms when American citizens felt 
their very way of life was at stake. 
 
Beyond the political impediments that had a 
destabilizing affect on the move to 
democratization, there were economic 
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impediments as well. The drop of 
commodity prices over the last three decades 
has had a particularly destabilizing effect on 
African nation states. The 1973 Oil Shock 
had an equally devastating effect on African 
governments. The increased debt burden that 
African governments had to assume because 
of the drop in commodity prices and the oil 
shock created a harsh environment for 
governance and democratic development. 
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But now that the Cold War has ended, the 
continent is free from Cairo to Cape Town, 
there is the Africa Growth and Opportunity 
Act, the issue of debt relief is on the table, 
capital flows, while not where they need to 
be, are increasing to Africa, and, at least for 
now, there is some stability in the oil 
market; the environmental factors are such 
that Africa has the best opportunity since the 
liberation struggles over the last four 
decades to proceed toward “normal” 
development. 
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The changed environment plus the resolve 
of African leaders are making for some 
miraculous and monumental changes. Just 
last month the African Presidential Archives 
and Research Center at Boston University 
released its first African Leaders’ State of 
Africa Report. This report documents some 
of the changes taking place. In assessing the 
state of democracy on the African continent 
my friend and colleague at the Center, 
Ambassador Stith puts it well: 
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“as the original thirteen colonies of the 
United States drove democratization and 
development on the North American 
continent; as are, at least, thirteen countries 
on the continent positioned to do the same 
on the African continent. Africa is more than 
the sum of its problems. And, the current 
trend toward democratization is the most 
compelling evidence for this case.” 
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Beyond his assessment, the evidence is 
ample that the arc of change on the continent 
bends toward democracy. As I said earlier, I 
co-led the Carter Center delegation to 
monitor the recent election in Kenya. Aside 
from the government’s effort to ensure a 
free and fair election, the evidence of 
Africa’s commitment to democracy was 
reflected in the faces of the people. It was 
reflected in the long lines. It is reflected in 
the hope they expressed. Even in Zimbabwe, 
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where the have been some questions about 
the health of democracy, that the people still 
stand in long lines to express their will and 
hopes for their country reflects that the roots 
of democracy run deep. 
 
Though in its infancy, democracy is alive, 
well, and growing on the continent of 
Africa.  
 
Some of the world’s most promising you 
democracies exist in countries like Benin, 
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Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and 
Zambia. With this growing vibrancy of 
democracy there have been some significant 
economic benefits as well: 
South Africa 
 
 “… When the first democratically 
elected government took office, we 
inherited a treasury in crisis. The fiscal 
deficit was over 9 percent and rising… 
this year’s budget deficit will not be 
higher than 1.7 percent of GDP.” 
 “Export of fully built-up motor vehicles 
have grown to well over 100,000 this 
year … within two or three years, South 
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Africa will be exporting 250,000 motor 
vehicles annually.” 
 “In the land reform program, 444,000 
hectares had been redistributed in the 
five years leading to the end of 1998; in 
the three years since then, the number 
has increased by 600,000 hectares. 
…While the number of houses built or 
under construction … currently stands at 
1.2 million.” 
 
Tanzania 
 
 “The GDP growth rate rose to 5.6 
percent in 2001, from 4.9 percent in 
2000, and is projected to rise to 5.9 
percent in 2002.” 
 “The growth of the mining sector 
remained strong at 13.5 percent and its 
contribution to GDP increased to 2.5 
percent.” 
 “By the end of October 2002, the rate of 
inflation was registered at 4.5 percent 
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having remained below 5 percent since 
October 2001.” 
 
Senegal 
 
 “Senegal came to the forefront in the 
fight against terrorism by being the first 
African country to organize and host a 
pan-African conference on terrorism on 
October 17, 2001. More than thirty-six 
countries attended the conference and 
adopted the Dakar Declaration against 
Terrorism.” 
 “(T)he privatization process, which is 
being carried out most smoothly. 
Senegal now has two mobile 
telecommunications operators and is on 
its way to the issuance of a third license, 
which the market demands.” 
 (T)ourism under President Wade has 
experienced an unprecedented 
expansion, with the number rising from 
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400,000 in the year 2000 to 700,000 in 
2002.” 
 
Nigeria 
 
 “(T)here are other new LNG as well as 
gas-to-liquid programmes that are 
currently ongoing. Consequently, by 
2008, exportable LNG would have 
increased to over 25 million metric tons, 
amounting to revenue of more than 50 
percent more than current earnings from 
crude.” 
 “Oil production capacity (has 
increased) from about 2.4 million to 
about 3 million barrels per day.” 
 “(T)he inflation has continued to fall 
since the first quarter of 2002. Inflation 
decelerated from about 19 percent in the 
first quarter of 2002 to about 14.8 
percent at the end of the third quarter. 
We expect inflation to be around 14 
percent at the end of 2002.” 
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Mozambique 
 
 (T)he resettlement and return to 
normalcy of 1.7 million citizens who had 
sought refuge in neighboring countries 
for over sixteen years of destabilizing 
war, and of 4.5 million displaced people, 
are indeed among Mozambique’s major 
political accomplishments.” 
 “This stable political environment, 
coupled with macroeconomic reforms, 
has made it possible to check inflation, 
stabilize our currency, and maintain the 
economy in a continuous growth 
average of 8 percent per year between 
1994 and 2002, with double digit growth 
in 1997, 1998, and 2001.” 
 “(We have) witnessed the birth, on 
Mozambican soil, of a state-of-the-art 
aluminum smelting industry. I am talking 
about Mozal, a $2 billion investment in 
two plants, the first one of which is in 
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full operation, with an expected output 
of 500,000 tons of aluminum ingots after 
the completion of the second phase.” 
 
Mauritius 
 
 “The economy has sustained a 6 percent 
annual growth rate for the last two 
decades, first driven by sugar, then by 
textiles, apparel and tourism, and most 
recently, by financial services.” 
 “Mauritius is now classified as a 
middle-income country and ranks, on the 
basis of the recent Human Development 
Index for 173 countries sixty-seventh 
globally.” 
 “In 2001, 522 companies of the 
Industrial Free Zone employed 87,607 
people. Textile exports to the United 
States, the European Union, and other 
markets generated $1 billion in 2001.” 
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Zambia 
 
 “Zambia has extensively reformed its 
trade regime, and today is one of the 
most liberalized in sub-Saharan Africa. 
As a result… there has been a surge in 
imports… reaching $1,258 million by 
2001.” 
 “In 2001, the (tourism) sector grew by 
24.2 percent, up from a growth rate of 
12.3 percent.” 
“By September 2002, a total of 256 
companies had been privatized out of a 
working portfolio of 280.” 
 
These signs of the times bode well for 
Africa’s future. 
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While democracy has not reached it full 
potential of the continent, I believe we’re 
headed in the right direction. 
 
I could conclude on this point but since 
Zimbabwe has figured most prominently in 
the news on Africa in the western media, let 
me close on that note. 
 
There are those that would conclude that the 
outcome of the recent election in Zimbabwe 
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confirms the death of democracy in that 
country, and perhaps in the region. Such a 
conclusion, to paraphrase Mark Twain, 
might be a “bit exaggerated.” There are 
several lessons to be gleaned from the latest 
“election” in Zimbabwe. The most obvious 
is that Robert Mugabe’s time has clearly 
come and gone. Whether we measure it in 
terms of his violation of the rule of law 
relative to the land seizures or the recent 
seriously flawed election. Or, whether we 
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base it on what Zimbabwe was at 
independence versus what it is now.  
 
I remember going to Zimbabwe at the point 
of its independence in 1980. The name of 
the capital city was still Salisbury and 
Harare was the center of black life in the 
area. The Zimbabwe dollar had near parity 
with the U.S. dollar, the nation was the 
breadbasket for the region, and it was the 
hope of the region and a place refugees from 
other countries came to find sanctuary. 
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Today, the currency trades at around 260 to 
the dollar, the country will need hundreds of 
millions of dollars of food aide, and 
Zimbabweans now flee their homeland 
seeking sanctuary and hope in other places. 
This is the most obvious point to be made 
relative to Zimbabwe; but it is not the only 
point reflected in the present circumstances 
in Zimbabwe or the region. 
 
A first, less obvious point is that while 
Mugabe’s position as a champion of 
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freedom and fairness has been compromised 
, the masses of people in Zimbabwe 
overwhelmingly demonstrated that they 
would not compromise their commitment to 
democratic values. The turnout for the 
election far exceeded what we see in the 
way of turnout for elections here. Not only 
was the turnout overwhelming, but people 
also endured the inconvenience of long lines 
and the threat of intimidation. 
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Secondly, the unilateral efforts of the West, 
however well intentioned, are not the most 
effective way to further movements for 
democratic governance. The EU’s sanctions, 
and the U.S. support for such, did not work 
in ensuring that the Movement for 
Democratic Change got a fair shot in 
Zimbabwe’s election. What we should 
appreciate is that such unilateral action 
comes across as “preachy” and self 
righteous, at best; or paternalistic, at worst. 
If the West wants to be helpful it is 
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important to work in partnership with 
regional leadership to find solutions to 
regional problems. I know that the 
leadership in the region was as aggrieved 
and concerned about the situation in 
Zimbabwe as anyone in the world 
community. And, given the stakes for the 
region it stands to reason. The opportunity 
for partnering with the regional leadership 
was there for the making. Had that 
opportunity been pursued it is quite possible 
that the outcome in Zimbabwe would have 
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been different. And, if not at the least, a 
framework for solving the problem could 
have been put in place that would have 
outlined complementary roles for all 
concerned.  
 
Thirdly, while Robert Mugabe is the most 
visible leader on the front pages of western 
newspapers he should not be portrayed as 
the face of Africa. Tanzania President 
Benjamin Mkapa is not Mugabe, nor is 
South African President Thabo Mbeki. 
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Botswanan President Festus Mogae is not 
Mugabe. Nor are Tanzania, South Africa, 
and Botswana Zimbabwe. There are leaders 
and countries on the continent of Africa that 
are serious about democracy; they are not 
simply talking the talk, but walking the 
walk. They deserved to be acknowledged as 
such; and they deserve our support. 
 
If the West, and particularly the United 
States as the world’s leading democracy, are 
as serious about democratization in Africa as 
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the hubbub would indicate we need to 
appreciate the further lessons that are 
reflected in the total picture coming out of 
Zimbabwe and the region. We must 
remember that democracies in the their 
infancies are not what they can be when they 
mature. Based on your own experience, do 
not forget that such anachronisms as the 
Electoral College were put in place to 
correct the mistakes of the people and not 
necessarily reflect the will of the people. 
You must remember as reflected in the 
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controversy of your last Presidential election 
that democracy is sometimes “messy”. This 
is not to say that the election in Zimbabwe 
reflects any of the above, it is simply to say 
that you must engage the leadership of these 
nascent democracies reflecting your 
experiences, and not your arrogance. If you 
do you will be able to share some valuable 
insights and encourage the needed 
perseverance if the grandest designs and 
loftiest hopes of the leaders and people of 
Africa are to be realized. 
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